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Abstract
This paper introduces Flexible BFT, a new approach for BFT consensus solution design revolving
around two pillars, stronger resilience and diversity. The first pillar, stronger resilience, involves a new
fault model called alive-but-corrupt faults. Alive-but-corrupt replicas may arbitrarily deviate from the
protocol in an attempt to break safety of the protocol. However, if they cannot break safety, they
will not try to prevent liveness of the protocol. Combining alive-but-corrupt faults into the model,
Flexible BFT is resilient to higher corruption levels than possible in a pure Byzantine fault model. The
second pillar, diversity, designs consensus solutions whose protocol transcript is used to draw different
commit decisions under diverse beliefs. With this separation, the same Flexible BFT solution supports
synchronous and asynchronous beliefs, as well as varying resilience threshold combinations of Byzantine
and alive-but-corrupt faults.
At a technical level, Flexible BFT achieves the above results using two new ideas. First, it introduces
a synchronous BFT protocol in which only the commit step requires to know the network delay bound and
thus replicas execute the protocol without any synchrony assumption. Second, it introduces a notion
called Flexible Byzantine Quorums by dissecting the roles of different quorums in existing consensus
protocols.
1 Introduction
Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols are used to build replicated services [31, 21, 32]. Recently, they
have received revived interest as the algorithmic foundation of what is known as decentralized ledgers, or
blockchains.
In the classic approach to BFT protocol designs, a protocol designer or a service administrator first picks
a set of assumptions (e.g., the fraction of Byzantine faults and certain timing assumptions) and then devises
a protocol (or chooses an existing one) tailored for that particular setting. The assumptions made by the
protocol designer are imposed upon all parties involved — every replica maintaining the service as well as
every client (also known as the ”learner” role) using the service. Such a protocol collapses if deployed under
settings that differ from the one it is designed for. In particular, optimal-resilience partially synchronous
solutions [12, 10] break (lose safety and liveness) if the fraction of Byzantine faults exceeds 1/3. Similarly,
optimal-resilience synchronous solutions [1, 15] do not obtain safety or liveness if the fraction of Byzantine
faults exceeds 1/2 or if the synchrony bound is violated.
In this work, we introduce a new approach for BFT protocol design called Flexible BFT. Our approach
offers advantages in the two aspects above. First, the Flexible BFT approach enables protocols that tolerate
more than 1/3 (resp. 1/2) corruption faults in the partial-synchrony (resp. synchrony) model — provided
that the number of Byzantine faults do not exceed the respective resilience bounds. Second, the Flexible BFT
approach allows a certain degree of separation between the fault model and the protocol design. As a result,
Flexible BFT allows diverse clients with different fault assumptions and timing assumptions (synchrony or
not) to participate in the same protocol. We elaborate on these two aspects below.
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Stronger resilience. We introduce a mixed fault model with a new type of fault called alive-but-corrupt
(a-b-c for short) faults. Alive-but-corrupt replicas actively try to disrupt the system from maintaining a safe
consensus decision and they might arbitrarily deviate from the protocol for this purpose. However, if they
cannot break safety, they will not try to prevent the system from reaching a (safe) decision. The rationale
for this new type of fault is that violating safety may provide the attacker gains (e.g., a double spend attack)
but preventing liveness usually does not. In fact, a-b-c replicas may gain rewards from keeping the replicated
service live, e.g., by collecting service fees. We show a family of protocols that tolerate a combination of
Byzantine and a-b-c faults that exceeds 1/3 in the partially synchronous model and exceeds 1/2 in the
synchronous model. Our results do not violate existing resilience bounds because the fraction of Byzantine
faults is always smaller than the respective bounds.
Diversity. The Flexible BFT approach further provides certain separation between the fault model and the
protocol. The design approach builds a protocol whose transcript can be interpreted by external clients with
diverse beliefs, who draw different consensus commit decisions based on their beliefs. Flexible BFT guaran-
tees safety and liveness so far as the clients’ beliefs are correct; thus two clients with correct assumptions
agree with each other. Clients specify (i) the fault threshold they need to tolerate, and (ii) the message delay
bound, if any, they believe in. For example, one instance of Flexible BFT can support a client that requires
tolerance against 1/5 Byzantine faults plus 3/10 a-b-c faults, while simultaneously supporting another client
who requires tolerance against 1/10 Byzantine faults plus 1/2 a-b-c faults, and a third client who believes
in synchrony and requires 3/10 Byzantine plus 2/5 a-b-c tolerance.
This novel separation of fault model from protocol design can be useful in practice in several ways. First,
different clients may naturally hold different assumptions about the system. Some clients may be more
cautious and require a higher resilience than others; some clients may believe in synchrony while others
do not. Moreover, even the same client may assume a larger fraction of faults when dealing with a $1M
transaction compared to a $5 one. The rationale is that more replicas may be willing to collude to double
spend a high-value transaction. In this case, the client can wait for more votes before committing the $1M
transaction. Last but not least, a client may update its assumptions based on certain events it observes. For
example, if a client receives votes for conflicting values, which may indicate an attempt at attacking safety,
it can start requiring more votes than usual; if a client who believes in synchrony notices abnormally long
message delays, which may indicate an attack on network infrastructure, it can update its synchrony bound
to be more conservative or switch to a partial-synchrony assumption.
The notion of “commit” needs to be clarified in our new model. Clients in Flexible BFT have different
assumptions and hence different commit rules. It is then possible and common that a value is committed by
one client but not another. Flexible BFT guarantees that any two clients whose assumptions are correct (but
possibly different) commit to the same value. If a client’s assumption is incorrect, however, it may commit
inconsistent values which may later be reverted. While this new notion of commit may sound radical at first,
it is the implicit behavior of existing BFT protocols. If the assumption made by the service administrator
is violated in a classic BFT protocol (e.g., there are more Byzantine faults than provisioned), clients may
commit to different values and they have no recourse. In this sense, Flexible BFT is a robust generalization
of classic BFT protocols. In Flexible BFT, if a client performs conflicting commits, it should update its
assumption to be more cautious and re-interpret what values are committed under its new assumption. In
fact, this “recovery” behavior is somewhat akin to Bitcoin. A client in Bitcoin decides how many confirma-
tions are needed (i.e., how “deeply buried”) to commit a block. If the client commits but subsequently an
alternative longer fork appears, its commit is reverted. Going forward, the client may increase the number
of confirmations it requires.
Key techniques. Flexible BFT centers around two new techniques. The first one is a novel synchronous
BFT protocol with replicas executing at network speed ; that is, the protocol run by the replicas does not
assume synchrony. This allows clients in the same protocol to assume different message delay bounds
and commit at their own pace. The protocol thus separates timing assumptions of replicas from timing
assumptions of clients. Note that this is only possible via Flexible BFT’s separation of protocol from the
fault model: the action of committing is only carried out by clients, not by replicas. The other technique
involves a breakdown of the different roles that quorums play in different steps of partially synchronous BFT
protocols. Once again, made possible by the separation in Flexible BFT, we will use one quorum size for
replicas to run a protocol, and let clients choose their own quorum sizes for committing in the protocol.
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Contributions. To summarize, our work has the following contributions.
1. Alive-but-corrupt faults. We introduce a new type of fault, called alive-but-corrupt fault, which
attack safety but not liveness.
2. Synchronous BFT with network speed replicas. We present a synchronous protocol in which
only the commit step requires synchrony. Since replicas no longer perform commits in our approach,
the protocol simultaneously supports clients assuming different synchrony bounds.
3. Flexible Byzantine Quorums. We deconstruct existing BFT protocols to understand the role played
by different quorums and introduce the notion of Flexible Byzantine Quorums. A protocol based on
Flexible Byzantine Quorums simultaneously supports clients assuming different fault models.
4. One BFT Consensus Solution for the Populace. Putting the above together, we present a new
approach for BFT design, Flexible BFT. Our approach has stronger resilience and diversity: Flexible
BFT tolerates a fraction of combined (Byzantine plus a-b-c) faults beyond existing resilience bounds.
And clients with diverse fault and timing beliefs are supported in the same protocol.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the Flexible BFT model
where replicas and clients are separated. We will describe in more detail our key techniques for synchrony
and partial-synchrony in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 puts these techniques together and presents
the final protocol. Section 6 discusses the result obtained by the Flexible BFT design and Section 7 describes
related work.
2 Modeling Flexible BFT
The goal of Flexible BFT is to build a replicated service that takes requests from clients and provides clients
an interface of a single non-faulty server, i.e., it provides clients with the same totally ordered sequence of
values. Internally, the replicated service uses multiple servers, also called replicas, to tolerate some number
of faulty servers. The total number of replicas is denoted by n. In this paper, whenever we speak about a
set of replicas or messages, we denote the set size as its fraction over n. For example, we refer to a set of m
replicas as “q replicas” where q = m/n.
Borrowing notation from Lamport [20], such a replicated service has three logical actors: proposers
capable of sending new values, acceptors who add these values to a totally ordered sequence (called a
blockchain), and learners who decide on a sequence of values based on the transcript of the protocol and
execute them on a state machine. Existing replication protocols provide the following two properties:
- Safety. Any two learners learn the same sequence of values.
- Liveness. A value proposed by a proposer will eventually be executed by every learner.
In existing replication protocols, the learners are assumed to be uniform, i.e., they interpret a transcript
using the same rules and hence decide on the same sequence of values. In Flexible BFT, we consider diverse
learners with different assumptions. Based on their own assumptions, they may interpret the transcript of
the protocol differently. We show that so far as the assumptions of two different learners are both correct,
they will eventually learn the same sequence of values. A replication protocol in the Flexible BFT approach
satisfies the following properties:
- Safety for diverse learners. Any two learners with correct but potentially different assumptions learn
the same sequence of values.
- Liveness for diverse learners. A value proposed by a proposer will eventually be executed by every
learner with a correct assumption.
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In a replicated service, clients act as proposers and learners, whereas the replicas (replicated servers) are
acceptors. Thus, safety and liveness guarantees are defined with respect to clients.
Fault model. We assume two types of faults within the replicas: Byzantine and alive-but-corrupt (a-b-c for
short). Byzantine replicas behave arbitrarily. On the other hand, the goal of a-b-c replicas is to attack safety
but to preserve liveness. These replicas will take any actions that help them break safety of the protocol.
However, if they cannot succeed in breaking safety, they will help provide liveness. Consequently, in this new
fault model, the safety proof should treat a-b-c replicas similarly to Byzantine. Then, once safety is proved,
the liveness proof can treat a-b-c replicas similarly to honest. We assume that the adversary is static, i.e.,
the adversary determines which replicas are Byzantine and a-b-c before the start of the protocol.
Other assumptions. We assume hash functions, digital signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
We use 〈x〉R to denote a message x signed by a replica R. We assume pair-wise communication channels
between replicas. We assume that all replicas have clocks that advance at the same rate.
3 Synchronous BFT with Network Speed Replicas - Overview
Protocol executed by the replicas.
1. Propose. The leader L of view v proposes a value b.
2. Vote. On receiving the first value b in a view v, a replica broadcasts b and votes for b if it is safe to
do so, as determined by a locking mechanism described later. The replica records the following.
- If the replica collects qr votes on b, denoted as Cqrv (b) and called a certificate of b from view v,
then it “locks” on b and records the lock time as t-lockv.
- If the replica observes an equivocating value signed by L at any time after entering view v, it
records the time of equivocation as t-equivv. It blames the leader by broadcasting 〈blame, v〉 and
the equivocating values.
- If the replica does not receive a proposal for sufficient time in view v, it times out and broadcasts
〈blame, v〉.
- If the replica collects a set of qr 〈blame, v〉 messages, it records the time as t-viewchangev,
broadcasts them and enters view v + 1.
If a replica locks on a value b in a view, then it votes only for b in subsequent views unless it “unlocks”
from b by learning that qr replicas are not locked on b in that view or higher views (they may be locked
on other values or they may not be locked at all).
Commit rules for clients. A value b is said to be committed by a client assuming ∆-synchrony iff qr
replicas each report that there exists a view v such that,
1. b is certified, i.e., Cqrv (b) exists.
2. the replica observed an undisturbed-2∆ period after certification, i.e., no equivocating value
or view change was observed at a time before 2∆ after it was certified, or more formally,
min(current-time, t-equivv, t-viewchangev)− t-lockv ≥ 2∆
Figure 1: Synchronous BFT with network speed replicas.
Early synchronous protocols [11, 17, 29] have relied on synchrony in two ways. First, the replicas assume a
maximum network delay ∆ for communication between them. Second, they require a lock step execution, i.e.,
all replicas are in the same round at the same time. Hanke et al. showed a synchronous protocol without
lock step execution [15]. Their protocol still contains a synchronous step in which all replicas perform a
blocking wait of 2∆ time before proceeding to subsequent steps. Sync HotStuff [4] improves on it further to
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remove replicas’ blocking waits during good periods (when the leader is honest), but blocking waits are still
required by replicas during bad situations (view changes).
In this section, we show a synchronous protocol where the replicas do not ever have blocking waits and
execute at the network speed. In other words, replicas run a partially synchronous protocol and do not rely
on synchrony at any point. Clients, on the other hand, rely on synchrony bounds to commit. This separation
is what allows our protocol to support clients with different assumptions on the value of ∆. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first synchronous protocol to achieve such a separation. In addition, the protocol
tolerates a combined Byzantine plus a-b-c fault ratio greater than a half (Byzantine fault tolerance is still
less than half).
For simplicity, in this overview, we show a protocol for single shot consensus. In our final protocol in
Section 5, we will consider a pipelined version of the protocol for consensus on a sequence of values. We do
not consider termination for the single-shot consensus protocol in this overview because our final replication
protocol is supposed to run forever.
The protocol is shown in Figure 1. It runs in a sequence of views. Each view has a designated leader
who may be selected in a round robin order. The leader drives consensus in that view. In each view, the
protocol runs in two steps – propose and vote. In the propose step, the leader proposes a value b. In the
vote step, replicas vote for the value if it is safe to do so. The vote also acts as a re-proposal of the value.
If a replica observes a set of qr votes on b, called a certificate Cqr (b), it “locks” on b. For now, we assume
qr = 1/2. (To be precise, qr is slight larger than 1/2, e.g., f + 1 out of 2f + 1.) We will revisit the choice of
qr in Section 6. In subsequent views, a replica will not vote for a value other than b unless it learns that qr
replicas are not locked on b. In addition, the replicas switch views (i.e., change leader) if they either observe
an equivocation or if they do not receive a proposal from the leader within some timeout. A client commits
b if qr replicas state that there exists a view in which b is certified and no equivocating value or view change
was observed at a time before 2∆ after it was certified. Here, ∆ is the maximum network delay the client
believes in.
The protocol ensures safety if there are fewer than qr faulty replicas. The key argument for safety is
the following: If an honest replica h satisfies the commit condition for some value b in a view, then (a) no
other value can be certified and (b) all honest replicas are locked on b at the end of that view. To elaborate,
satisfying the commit condition implies that some honest replica h has observed an undisturbed-2∆ period
after it locked on b, i.e., it did not observe an equivocation or a view change. Suppose the condition is
satisfied at time t. This implies that other replicas did not observe an equivocation or a view change before
t−∆. The two properties above hold if the quorum honesty conditions described below hold. For liveness,
if Byzantine leaders equivocate or do not propose a safe value, they will be blamed by both honest and a-b-c
replicas and a view change will ensue. Eventually there will be an honest or a-b-c leader to drive consensus
if quorum availability holds.
Quorum honesty (a) within a view. Since the undisturbed period starts after b is certified, h must have
voted (and re-proposed) b at a time earlier than t − 2∆. Every honest replica must have received b
before t−∆. Since they had not voted for an equivocating value by then, they must have voted for b.
Since the number of faults is less than qr, every certificate needs to contain an honest replica’s vote.
Thus, no certificate for any other value can be formed in this view.
Quorum honesty (b) across views. h sends Cqrv (b) at time t − 2∆. All honest receive Cqrv (b) by time
t−∆ and become locked on b. For an honest replica to unlock from b in subsequent views, qr replicas
need to claim that they are not locked on b. At least one of them is honest and would need to falsely
claim it is not locked, which cannot happen.
Quorum availability. Byzantine replicas do not exceed 1− qr so that qr replicas respond to the leader.
Tolerating a-b-c faults. If we have only honest and Byzantine replicas (and no a-b-c replicas), quorum
honesty requires the fraction of Byzantine replicas B < qr. Quorum availability requires B ≤ 1 − qr. If we
optimize for maximizing B, we obtain qr ≥ 1/2. Now, suppose P represents the fraction of a-b-c replicas.
Quorum honesty requires B + P < qr, and quorum availability requires B ≤ 1 − qr. Thus, the protocol
supports varying values of B and P at different values of qr > 1/2 such that safety and liveness are both
preserved.
5
Separating client synchrony assumption from the replica protocol. The most interesting aspect of
this protocol is the separation of the client commit rule from the protocol design. In particular, although this
is a synchronous protocol, the replica protocol does not rely on any synchrony bound. This allows clients to
choose their own message delay bounds. Any client that uses a correct message delay bound enjoys safety.
4 Flexible Byzantine Quorums for Partial Synchrony - Overview
In this section, we explain the high-level insights of Flexible Byzantine Quorums in Flexible BFT. Again,
for ease of exposition, we focus on a single-shot consensus and do not consider termination. We start by
reviewing the Byzantine Quorum Systems [25] that underlie existing partially synchronous protocols that
tolerate 1/3 Byzantine faults (Section 4.1). We will illustrate that multiple uses of 2/3-quorums actually
serve different purposes in these protocols. We then generalize these protocols to use Flexible Byzantine
Quorums (Section 4.2), the key idea that enables more than 1/3 fault tolerance and allows diverse clients
with varying assumptions to co-exist.
4.1 Background: Quorums in PBFT
Existing protocols for solving consensus in the partially synchronous setting with optimal 1/3-resilience
revolve around voting by Byzantine quorums of replicas. Two properties of Byzantine quorums are utilized for
achieving safety and liveness. First, any two quorums intersect at one honest replica – quorum intersection.
Second, there exists a quorum that contains no Byzantine faulty replicas – quorum availability. Concretely,
when less than 1/3 the replicas are Byzantine, quorums are set to size qr = 2/3. (To be precise, qr is slightly
larger than 2/3, i.e., 2f + 1 out of 3f + 1 where f is the number of faults, but we will use qr = 2/3 for ease of
exposition.) This guarantees an intersection of size at least 2qr − 1 = 1/3, hence at least one honest replica
in the intersection. As for availability, there exist qr = 2/3 honest replicas to form a quorum.
To dissect the use of quorums in BFT protocols, consider their use in PBFT [10] for providing safety
and liveness. PBFT operates in a view-by-view manner. Each view has a unique leader and consists of the
following steps:
- Propose. A leader L proposes a value b.
- Vote 1. On receiving the first value b for a view v, a replica votes for b if it is safe, as determined by
a locking mechanism described below. A set of qr votes form a certificate Cqr (b).
- Vote 2. On collecting Cqr (b), a replica “locks” on b and votes for Cqr (b).
- Commit. On collecting qr votes for Cqr (b), a client learns that proposal b becomes a committed
decision.
If a replica locks on a value b in a view, then it votes only for b in subsequent views unless it “unlocks” from
b. A replica “unlocks” from b if it learns that qr replicas are not locked on b in that view or higher (they
may be locked on other values or they may not be locked at all).
The properties of Byzantine quorums are harnessed in PBFT for safety and liveness as follows:
Quorum intersection within a view. Safety within a view is ensured by the first round of votes. A
replica votes only once per view. For two distinct values to both obtain certificates, one honest replica
needs to vote for both, which cannot happen.
Quorum intersection across views. Safety across views is ensured by the locking mechanism. If b be-
comes a committed decision in a view, then a quorum of replicas lock on b in that view. For an honest
replica among them to unlock from b, a quorum of replicas need to claim they are not locked on b. At
least one replica in the intersection is honest and would need to falsely claim it is not locked, which
cannot happen.
Quorum availability within a view. Liveness within each view is guaranteed by having an honest quo-
rum respond to a non-faulty leader.
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4.2 Flexible Byzantine Quorums
Our Flexible BFT approach separates the quorums used in BFT protocols for the replicas (acceptors) from
the quorums used for learning when a decision becomes committed. More specifically, we denote the quorum
used for forming certificates (locking) by qlck and the quorum used for unlocking by qulck. We denote the
quorum employed by clients for learning certificate uniqueness by qunq, and the quorum used for learning
commit safety by qcmt. In other words, clients mandate qunq first-round votes and qcmt second-round votes
in order to commit a decision. Below, we outline a modified PBFT-like protocol that uses these different
quorum sizes instead of a single quorum size q. We then introduce a new definition, Flexible Byzantine
Quorums, that capture the requirements needed for these quorums to provide safety and liveness.
- Propose. A leader L proposes a value b.
- Vote 1. On receiving the first value b for a view v, a replica votes for b if it is safe, as determined by a
locking mechanism described below. A set of qlck votes forms a certificate Cqlck(b).
- Vote 2. On collecting Cqlck(b), a replica “locks” on b and votes for Cqlck(b).
- Commit. On collecting qunq votes for b and qcmt votes for Cqlck(b), a client learns that proposal b
becomes a committed decision.
If a replica locks on a value b in a view, then it votes only for b in subsequent views unless it “unlocks”
from b by learning that qulck replicas are not locked on b.
Flexible quorum intersection (a) within a view. Contrary to PBFT, in Flexible BFT, a pair of qlck
certificates need not necessarily intersect in an honest replica. Indeed, locking on a value does not
preclude conflicting locks. It only mandates that every qlck quorum intersects with every qunq quorum
at at least one honest replica. For safety, it is essential that the fraction of faulty replicas is less than
qlck + qunq − 1.
Flexible quorum intersection (b) across views. If a client commits a value b in a view, qcmt replicas
lock on b in that view. For an honest replica among them to unlock from b, qulck replicas need to claim
they are not locked on b. This property mandates that every qulck quorum intersects with every qcmt
quorum at at least one honest replica. Thus, for safety, it is essential that the fraction of faulty replicas
is less than qulck + qcmt − 1.
Flexible quorum availability within a view. For liveness, Byzantine replicas cannot exceed 1 −
max(qunq, qcmt, qlck, qulck) so that the aforementioned quorums can be formed at different stages of
the protocol.
Given the above analysis, Flexible BFT ensures safety if the fraction of faulty replicas is less than
min(qunq + qlck − 1, qcmt + qulck − 1), and provides liveness if the fraction of Byzantine replicas is at most
1−max(qunq, qcmt, qlck, qulck). It is optimal to use balanced quorum sizes where qlck = qulck and qunq = qcmt.
To see this, first note that we should make sure qunq + qlck = qcmt + qulck; otherwise, suppose the right-
hand side is smaller, then setting (qcmt, qulck) to equal (qunq, qlck) improves safety tolerance without affecting
liveness tolerance. Next, observe that if we have qunq + qlck = qcmt + qulck but qlck > qulck (and hence
qunq < qcmt), then once again setting (qcmt, qulck) to equal (qunq, qlck) improves safety tolerance without
affecting liveness tolerance.
Thus, in this paper, we set qlck = qr and qunq = qcmt = qc. Since replicas use qr votes to lock, these votes
can always be used by the clients to commit qcmt quorums. Thus, qc ≥ qr. The Flexible Byzantine Quorum
requirements collapse into the following two conditions.
Flexible quorum intersection. The fraction of faulty replicas is < qc + qr − 1.
Flexible quorum availability. The fraction of Byzantine replicas is ≤ 1− qc.
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Tolerating a-b-c faults. If all faults in the system are Byzantine faults, then the best parameter choice
is qc = qr ≥ 2/3 for < 1/3 fault tolerance, and Flexible Byzantine Quorums degenerate to basic Byzantine
quorums. However, in our model, a-b-c replicas are only interested in attacking safety but not liveness. This
allows us to tolerate qc+qr−1 total faults (Byzantine plus a-b-c), which can be more than 1/3. For example,
if we set qr = 0.7 and qc = 0.8, then such a protocol can tolerate 0.2 Byzantine faults plus 0.3 a-b-c faults.
We discuss the choice for qr and qc and their rationale in Section 6.
Separating client commit rules from the replica protocol. A key property of the Flexible Byzantine
Quorum approach is that it decouples the BFT protocol from client commit rules. The decoupling allows
clients assuming different fault models to utilize the same protocol. In the above protocol, the propose and
two voting steps are executed by the replicas and they are only parameterized by qr. The commit step can
be carried by different clients using different commit thresholds qc. Thus, a fixed qr determines a possible set
of clients with varying commit rules (in terms of Byzantine and a-b-c adversaries). Recall that a Byzantine
adversary can behave arbitrarily and thus may not provide liveness whereas an a-b-c adversary only intends
to attack safety but not liveness. Thus, a client who believes that a large fraction of the adversary may
attempt to break safety, not progress, can choose a larger qc. By doing so, it seeks stronger safety against
dishonest replicas, while trading liveness. Conversely, a client that assumes that a large fraction of the
adversary attacks liveness must choose a smaller qc.
5 Flexible BFT Protocol
In this section, we combine the ideas presented in Sections 3 and 4 to obtain a final protocol that supports
both types of clients. A client can either assume partial synchrony, with freedom to choose qc as described
in the previous section, or assume synchrony with its own choice of ∆, as described in Section 3. Replicas
execute a protocol at the network speed with a parameter qr. We first give the protocol executed by
the replicas and then discuss how clients commit depending on their assumptions. Moreover, inspired by
Casper [8] and HotStuff [34], we show a protocol where the rounds of voting can be pipelined.
5.1 Notation
Before describing the protocol, we will first define some data structures and terminologies that will aid
presentation.
Block format. The pipelined protocol forms a chain of values. We use the term block to refer to each
value in the chain. We refer to a block’s position in the chain as its height. A block Bk at height k has the
following format
Bk := (bk, hk−1)
where bk denotes a proposed value at height k and hk−1 := H(Bk−1) is a hash digest of the predecessor block.
The first block B1 = (b1,⊥) has no predecessor. Every subsequent block Bk must specify a predecessor block
Bk−1 by including a hash of it. We say a block is valid if (i) its predecessor is valid or ⊥, and (ii) its proposed
value meets application-level validity conditions and is consistent with its chain of ancestors (e.g., does not
double spend a transaction in one of its ancestor blocks).
Block extension and equivocation. We say Bl extends Bk, if Bk is an ancestor of Bl (l > k). We say
two blocks Bl and B
′
l′ equivocate one another if they are not equal and do not extend one another.
Certificates and certified blocks. In the protocol, replicas vote for blocks by signing them. We use
Cqrv (Bk) to denote a set of signatures on hk = H(Bk) by qr replicas in view v. qr is a parameter fixed for
the protocol instance. We call Cqrv (Bk) a certificate for Bk from view v. Certified blocks are ranked first by
the views in which they are certified and then by their heights. In other words, a block Bk certified in view
v is ranked higher than a block Bk′ certified in view v
′ if either (i) v > v′ or (ii) v = v′ and k > k′.
Locked blocks. At any time, a replica locks the highest certified block to its knowledge. During the
protocol execution, each replica keeps track of all signatures for all blocks and keeps updating its locked
block. Looking ahead, the notion of locked block will be used to guard the safety of a client commit.
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Let v be the current view number and replica L be the leader in this view. Perform the following steps in
an iteration.
1. Propose. . Executed by the leader of view v
The leader L broadcasts 〈propose, Bk, v, Cqrv′ (Bk−1),S〉L. Here, Bk := (bk, hk−1) is the newly proposed
block and it should extend the highest certified block known to L. In the steady state, an honest leader
L would extend the previous block it proposed, in which case v′ = v and S = ⊥. Immediately after a
view change, L determines the highest certified block from the status S received during the view change.
2. Vote. . Executed by all replicas
When a replica R receives a valid proposal 〈propose, Bk, v, Cqrv′ (Bk−1),S〉L from the leader L, R broad-
casts the proposal and a vote 〈vote, Bk, v〉R if (i) the proposal is the first one in view v, and it extends
the highest certified block in S, or (ii) the proposal extends the last proposed block in the view.
In addition, replica R records the following based on the messages it receives.
- R keeps track of the number of votes received for this block in this view as qBk,v.
- If block Bk−1 has been proposed in view v, R marks Bk−1 as a locked block and records the locked
time as t-lockk−1,v.
- If a block equivocating Bk−1 is proposed by L in view v (possibly received through a vote), R
records the time t-equivk−1,v at which the equivocating block is received.
The replica then enters the next iteration. If the replica observes no progress or equivocating blocks in
the same view v, it stops voting in view v and sends 〈blame, v〉r message to all replicas.
Figure 2: Flexible BFT steady state protocol.
5.2 Replica Protocol
The replica protocol progresses in a view-by-view fashion. Each view has a designated leader who is respon-
sible for driving consensus on a sequence of blocks. Leaders can be chosen statically, e.g., round robin, or
randomly using more sophisticated techniques [9, 28]. In our description, we assume a round robin selection
of leaders, i.e., (v mod n) is the leader of view v.
At a high level, the protocol does the following: The leader proposes a block to all replicas. The replicas
vote on it if safe to do so. The block becomes certified once qr replicas vote on it. The leader will then propose
another block extending the previous one, chaining blocks one after another at increasing heights. Unlike
regular consensus protocols where replicas determine when a block is committed, in Flexible BFT, replicas
only certify blocks while committing is offloaded to the clients. If at any time replicas detect malicious leader
behavior or lack of progress in a view, they blame the leader and engage in a view change protocol to replace
the leader and move to the next view. The new leader collects a status from different replicas and continues
to propose blocks based on this status. We explain the steady state and view change protocols in more detail
below.
Steady state protocol. The steady state protocol is described in Figure 2. In the steady state, there
is a unique leader who, in an iteration, proposes a block, waits for votes from qr replicas and moves to
the next iteration. In the steady state, an honest leader always extends the previous block it proposed.
Immediately after a view change, since the previous leaders could have been Byzantine and may have
proposed equivocating blocks, the new leader needs to determine a safe block to propose. It does so by
collecting a status of locked blocks from qr replicas denoted by S (described in the view change protocol).
For a replica R in the steady state, on receiving a proposal for block Bk, a replica votes for it if it extends
the previous proposed block in the view or if it extends the highest certified block in S. Replica R can
potentially receive blocks out of order and thus receive Bk before its ancestor blocks. In this case, replica R
waits until it receives the ancestor blocks, verifies the validity of those blocks and Bk before voting for Bk.
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In addition, replica R records the following to aid a client commit:
- Number of votes. It records the number of votes received for Bk in view v as qBk,v. Observe that
votes are broadcast by all replicas and the number of votes for a block can be greater than qr. qBk,v
will be updated each time the replica hears about a new vote in view v.
- Lock time. If Bk−1 was proposed in the same view v, it locks Bk−1 and records the locked time as
t-lockk−1,v.
- Equivocation time. If the replica ever observes an equivocating block at height k in view v through
a proposal or vote, it stores the time of equivocation as t-equivk,v.
Looking ahead, the locked time t-lockk−1,v and equivocation time t-equivk−1,v will be used by clients with
synchrony assumptions to commit, and the number of votes qBk,v will be used by clients with partial-
synchrony assumptions to commit.
Leader monitoring. If a replica detects a lack of progress in view v or observes malicious leader behavior
such as more than one height-k blocks in the same view, it blames the leader of view v by broadcasting a
〈blame, v〉 message. It quits view v and stops voting and broadcasting blocks in view v. To determine lack
of progress, the replicas may simply guess a time bound for message arrival or use increasing timeouts for
each view [10].
View change. The view change protocol is described in Figure 3. If a replica gathers qr 〈blame, v〉 messages
from distinct replicas, it forwards them to all other replicas and enters a new view v+1 (Step (i)). It records
the time at which it received the blame certificate as t-viewchangev. Upon entering a new view, a replica
reports to the leader of the new view L′ its locked block and transitions to the steady state (Step (ii)). qr
status messages form the status S. The first block L′ proposes in the new view should extend the highest
certified block among these qr status messages.
Let L and L′ be the leaders of views v and v + 1, respectively.
(i) New-view. Upon gathering qr 〈blame, v〉 messages, broadcast them and enter view v + 1. Record
the time as t-viewchangev.
(ii) Status. Suppose Bj is the block locked by the replica. Send a status of its locked block to the leader
L′ using 〈status, v, Bj , Cqrv′ (Bj)〉 and transition to the steady state. Here, v′ is the view in which Bj
was certified.
Figure 3: Flexible BFT view change protocol.
5.3 Client Commit Rules
As mentioned in the introduction, Flexible BFT supports clients with different assumptions. Clients in
Flexible BFT learn the state of the protocol from the replicas and based on their own assumptions determine
whether a block has been committed. Broadly, we supports two types of clients: those who believe in
synchrony and those who believe in partial synchrony.
5.3.1 Clients with Partial-Synchrony Assumptions (CR1)
A client with partial-synchrony assumptions deduces whether a block has been committed by based on the
number of votes received by a block. A block Bl (together with its ancestors) is committed with parameter
qc iff Bl and its immediate successor both receive ≥ qc votes in the same view.
Safety of CR1. A CR1 commit based on qc votes is safe against < qc + qr − 1 faulty replicas (Byzantine
plus a-b-c). Observe that if Bl gets qc votes in view v, due to flexible quorum intersection, a conflicting block
cannot be certified in view v, unless ≥ qc + qr − 1 replicas are faulty. Moreover, Bl+1 extending Bl has also
received qc votes in view v. Thus, qc replicas lock block Bl in view v. In subsequent views, honest replicas
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(CR1) Partially-synchronous commit. A block Bk is committed under the partially synchronous
rule with parameter qc iff there exist l ≥ k and v such that
(a) Cqrv (Bl) and Cqrv (Bl+1) exist where Bl+1 extends Bl and Bk (if l = k, Bl = Bk).
(b) qBl,v ≥ qc and qBl+1,v ≥ qc.
(CR2) Synchronous commit. A block Bk is committed assuming ∆−synchrony iff the following holds
for qr replicas. There exist l ≥ k and v (possibly different across replicas) such that,
(a) Cqrv (Bl) exists where Bl extends Bk (if l = k, Bl = Bk).
(b) An undisturbed-2∆ period is observed after Bl+1 is obtained, i.e., no equivocating block or view
change of view v were observed before 2∆ time after Bl+1 was obtained, i.e.,
min(current-time, t-equivl,v, t-viewchangev)− t-lockl,v ≥ 2∆
Figure 4: Flexible BFT commit rules
that have locked Bl will only vote for a block that equals or extends Bl unless they unlock. However, due to
flexible quorum intersection, they will not unlock unless ≥ qc + qr − 1 replicas are faulty. Proof of Lemma 1
formalizes this argument.
5.3.2 Client with Synchrony Assumptions (CR2)
Intuitively, a CR2 commit involves qr replicas collectively stating that no “bad event” happens within
“sufficient time” in a view. Here, a bad event refers to either leader equivocation or view change (the latter
indicates sufficient replicas believe leader is faulty) and the “sufficient time” is 2∆; where ∆ is a synchrony
bound chosen by the client. More formally, a replica states that a synchronous commit for block Bk for a
given parameter ∆ (set by a client) is satisfied iff the following holds. There exists Bl+1 that extends Bl and
Bk, and the replica observes an undisturbed-2∆ period after obtaining Bl+1 during which (i) no equivocating
block is observed, and (ii) no blame certificate/view change certificate for view v was obtained, i.e.,
min(current-time, t-equivl,v, t-viewchangev)− t-lockl,v ≥ 2∆
where t-equivl,v denotes the time equivocation for Bl in view v was observed (∞ if no equivocation),
t-viewchangev denotes the time at which view change happened from view v to v + 1 (∞ if no view change
has happened yet), and t-lockl,v denotes the time at which Bl was locked (or Bl+1 was proposed) in view v.
Note that the client does not require the qr fraction of replicas to report the same height l or view v.
Safety of CR2. A client believing in synchrony assumes that all messages between replicas arrive within
∆ time after they were sent. If the client’s chosen ∆ is a correct upper bound on message delay, then a CR2
commit is safe against qr faulty replicas (Byzantine plus a-b-c), as we explain below. If less than qr replicas
are faulty, at least one honest replica reported an undisturbed-2∆ period. Let us call this honest replica
h and analyze the situation from h’s perspective to explain why an undisturbed 2∆ period ensures safety.
Observe that replicas in Flexible BFT forward the proposal when voting. If ∆-synchrony holds, every other
honest replica learns about the proposal Bl at most ∆ time after h learns about it. If any honest replica
voted for a conflicting block or quit view v, h would have known within 2∆ time.
5.4 Safety and Liveness
We introduce the notion of direct and indirect commit to aid the proofs. We say a block is committed
directly under CR1 if the block and its immediate successor both get qc votes in the same view. We say
a block is committed directly under CR2 if some honest replica reports an undisturbed-2∆ period after its
successor block was obtained. We say a block is committed indirectly if neither condition applies to it but it
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is committed as a result of a block extending it being committed directly. We remark that the direct commit
notion, especially for CR2, is merely a proof technique. A client cannot tell whether a replica is honest, and
thus has no way of knowing whether a block is directly committed under CR2.
Lemma 1. If a client directly commits a block Bl in view v using a correct commit rule, then a certified
block that ranks no lower than Cqrv (Bl) must equal or extend Bl.
Proof. To elaborate on the lemma, a certified block Cqrv′ (B′l′) ranks no lower than Cqrv (Bl) if either (i) v′ = v
and l′ ≥ l, or (ii) v′ > v. We need to show that if Bl is directly committed, then any certified block that
ranks no lower either equals or extends Bl. We consider the two commit rules separately. For both commit
rules, we will use induction on v′ to prove the lemma.
For CR1 with parameter qc to be correct, flexible quorum intersection needs to hold, i.e., the fraction
of faulty replicas must be less than qc + qr − 1. Bl being directly committed under CR1 with parameter qc
implies that there are qc votes in view v for Bl and Bl+1 where Bl+1 extends Bl.
For the base case, a block B′l′ with l
′ ≥ l that does not extend Bl cannot get certified in view v, because
that would require qc + qr − 1 replicas to vote for two equivocating blocks in view v.
Next, we show the inductive step. Note that qc replicas voted for Bl+1 in view v, which contains Cqrv (Bl).
Thus, they lock Bl or a block extending Bl by the end of view v. Due to the inductive hypothesis, any
certified block that ranks equally or higher from view v up to view v′ either equals or extends Bl. Thus, by
the end of view v′, those qc replicas still lock Bl or a block extending Bl. Since the total fraction of faults
is less than qc + qr − 1, the status S shown by the leader of view v′ + 1 must include a certificate for Bl or
a block extending it; moreover, any certificate that ranks equal to or higher than Cqrv (Bl) is for a block that
equals or extends Bl. Thus, only a block that equals or extends Bl can gather votes from those qc replicas
in view v′ + 1 and only a block that equals or extends Bl can get certified in view v′ + 1.
For CR2 with synchrony bound ∆ to be correct, ∆ must be an upper bound on worst case message
delay and the fraction of faulty replicas is less than qr. Bl being directly committed under CR2 with ∆-
synchrony implies that at least one honest replica voted for Bl+1 extending Bl in view v, and did not hear an
equivocating block or view change within 2∆ time after that. Call this replica h. Suppose h voted for Bl+1
extending Bl in view v at time t, and did not hear an equivocating block or view change by time t + 2∆.
We first show the base case: a block B′l′ with l
′ ≥ l certified in view v must equal or extend Bl. Observe
that if B′l′ with l
′ ≥ l does not equal or extend Bl, then it equivocates Bl. No honest replica voted for B′l′
before time t+∆, because otherwise h would have received the vote for B′l′ by time t+2∆, No honest replica
would vote for B′l′ after time t+ ∆ either, because by then they would have received (from h) and voted for
Bl. Thus, B
′
l′ cannot get certified in view v.
We then show the inductive step. Because h did not hear view change by time t+ 2∆, all honest replicas
are still in view v by time t+ ∆, which means they all receive Bl+1 from h by the end of view v. Thus, they
lock Bl or a block extending Bl by the end of view v. Due to the inductive hypothesis, any certified block
that ranks equally or higher from view v up to view v′ either equals or extends Bl. Thus, by the end of view
v′, all honest replicas still lock Bl or a block extending Bl. Since the total fraction of faults is less than qr,
the status S shown by the leader of view v′ + 1 must include a certificate for Bl or a block extending it;
moreover, any certificate that ranks equal to or higher than Cqrv (Bl) is for a block that equals or extends Bl.
Thus, only a block that equals or extends Bl can gather honest votes in view v
′ + 1 and only a block that
equals or extends Bl can get certified in view v
′ + 1.
Theorem 2 (Safety). Two clients with correct commit rules commit the same block Bk for each height k.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that two distinct blocks Bk and B
′
k are committed at height k. Suppose
Bk is committed as a result of Bl being directly committed in view v and B
′
k is committed as a result of
B′l′ being directly committed in view v
′. This implies Bl is or extends Bk; similarly, B′l′ is or extends B
′
k.
Without loss of generality, assume v ≤ v′. If v = v′, further assume l ≤ l′ without loss of generality. By
Lemma 1, the certified block Cqrv′ (B′l′) must equal or extend Bl. Thus, B′k = Bk.
Theorem 3 (Liveness). If all clients have correct commit rules, they all keep committing new blocks.
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Figure 5: Clients supported for qr = 2/3.
Proof. By the definition of a-b-c faults, if they cannot violate safety, they will preserve liveness. Theorem 2
shows that if all clients have correct commit rules, then safety is guaranteed even if a-b-c replicas behave
arbitrarily. Thus, once we proved safety, we can treat a-b-c replicas as honest when proving liveness.
Observe that a correct commit rule tolerates at most 1 − qr Byzantine faults. If a Byzantine leader
prevents liveness, there will be qr blame messages against it, and a view change will ensue to replace the
leader. Eventually, a non-Byzantine (honest or a-b-c) replica becomes the leader and drives consensus in
new heights. If replicas use increasing timeouts, eventually, all non-Byzantine replicas stay in the same view
for sufficiently long. When both conditions occur, if a client’s commit rule is correct (either CR1 and CR2),
due to quorum availability, it will receive enough votes in the same view to commit.
5.5 Efficiency
Latency. Clients with a synchrony assumption incur a latency of 2∆ plus a few network speed rounds. In
terms of the maximum network delay ∆, this matches the state-of-the-art synchronous protocols [4]. The
distinction though is that ∆ now depends on the client assumption and hence different clients may commit
with different latencies Clients with partial-synchrony assumptions incur a latency of two rounds of voting;
this matches PBFT [10].
Communication. Every vote and new-view messages are broadcast to all replicas, incurring O(n2) com-
munication messages. This is the same complexity of PBFT [10] and Sync HotStuff [4].
6 Discussion
As we have seen, three parameters qr, qc, and ∆ determine the protocol. qr is the only parameter for the
replicas and is picked by the service administrator. The choice of qr determines a set of client assumptions
that can be supported. qc and ∆ are chosen by clients to commit blocks. In this section, we first discuss the
client assumptions supported by a given qr and then discuss the trade-offs between different choices of qr.
6.1 Client Assumptions Supported by qr
Figure 5 represents the clients supported at qr = 2/3. The x-axis represents Byzantine faults and the y-axis
represents total faults (Byzantine plus a-b-c). Each point on this graph represents a client fault assumption
as a pair: (Byzantine faults, total faults). The shaded gray area indicates an “invalid area” since we cannot
have fewer total faults than Byzantine faults. A missing dimension in this figure is the choice of ∆. Thus,
the synchrony guarantee shown in this figure is for clients that choose a correct synchrony bound.
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Clients with partial-synchrony assumptions can get fault tolerance on (or below) the starred orange line.
The right most point on the line is (1/3, 1/3), i.e., we tolerate less than a third of Byzantine replicas and no
additional a-b-c replicas. This is the setting of existing partially synchronous consensus protocols [12, 10, 34].
Flexible BFT generalizes these protocols by giving clients the option of moving up-left along the line, i.e.,
tolerating fewer Byzantine and more total faults. By choosing qc > qr, a client tolerates < qc + qr − 1 total
faults for safety and ≤ 1− qc Byzantine faults for liveness. In other words, as a client moves left, for every
additional vote it requires, it tolerates one fewer Byzantine fault and gains overall one higher total number of
faults (i.e., two more a-b-c faults). The left most point on this line (0, 2/3) tolerating no Byzantine replicas
and the highest fraction of a-b-c replicas.
Moreover, for clients who believe in synchrony, if their ∆ assumption is correct, they enjoy 1/3 Byzantine
tolerance and 2/3 total tolerance represented by the green diamond. This is because synchronous commit
rules are not parameterized by the number of votes received.
How do clients pick their commit rules? In Figure 5, the shaded starred orange portion of the plot
represent fault tolerance provided by the partially synchronous commit rule (CR1). Specifically, setting
qc to the total fault fraction yields the necessary commit rule. On the other hand, if a client’s required
fault tolerance lies in the circled green portion of the plot, then the synchronous commit rule (CR2) with
an appropriate ∆ picked by the client yields the necessary commit rule. Finally, if a client’s target fault
tolerance corresponds to the white region of the plot, then it is not achievable with this qr.
Clients with incorrect assumptions and recovery. If a client has incorrect assumption with respect
to the fault threshold or synchrony parameter ∆, then it can lose safety or liveness. If a client believing in
synchrony picks too small a ∆ and commits a value b, it is possible that a conflicting value b′ may also be
certified. Replicas may choose to extend the branch containing b′, effectively reverting b and causing a safety
violation. Whenever a client detects such a safety violation, it may need to revert some of its commits and
increase ∆ to recover.
For a client with partial-synchrony assumption, if it loses safety, it can update its fault model to move
left along the orange starred line, i.e., tolerate higher total faults but fewer Byzantine. On the other hand,
if it observes no progress as its threshold qc is not met, then it moves towards the right. However, if the true
fault model is in the circled green region in Figure 5, then the client cannot find a partially synchronous
commit rule that is both safe and live and eventually has to switch to using a synchronous commit rule.
Recall that the goal of a-b-c replicas is to attack safety. Thus, clients with incorrect assumptions may
be exploited by a-b-c replicas for their own gain (e.g., by double-spending). When a client updates to a
correct assumption and recovers from unsafe commits, their subsequent commits would be safe and final.
This is remotely analogous to Bitcoin – if a client commits to a transaction when it is a few blocks deep and
a powerful adversary succeeds in creating an alternative longer fork, the commit is reverted.
6.2 Comparing Different qr Choices
We now look at the service administrator’s choice at picking qr. In general, the service administrator’s goal
is to tolerate a large number of Byzantine and a-b-c faults, i.e., move towards top and/or right of the figure.
Figure 6 shows the trade-offs in terms of clients supported by different qr values in Flexible BFT.
First, it can be observed that for clients with partial-synchrony assumptions, qr ≥ 2/3 dominates qr < 2/3.
Observe that the fraction of Byzantine replicas (B) are bounded by B < qc + qr − 1 and B ≤ 1 − qc, so
B ≤ qr/2. Thus, as qr decreases, Byzantine fault tolerance decreases. Moreover, since the total fault
tolerance is qc + qr − 1, a lower qr also tolerates a smaller fraction of total faults for a fixed qc.
For qr ≥ 2/3 or for clients believing in synchrony, no value of qr is Pareto optimal. For clients with partial-
synchrony assumptions, as qr increases, the total fault tolerance for safety increases. But since qc ≥ qr, we
have B ≤ 1−qr, and hence the Byzantine tolerance for liveness decreases. For clients believing in synchrony,
the total fault tolerance for safety is < qr and the Byzantine fault tolerance for liveness is ≥ 1− qr. In both
cases, the choice of qr represents a safety-liveness trade-off.
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Figure 6: Clients supported by Flexible BFT at different qr’s. The legend represents the different qr values.
6.3 Separating Alive-but-corrupt Resilience from Diversity
So far, we presented the Flexible BFT techniques and protocols to simultaneously support diverse client sup-
port and stronger a-b-c fault tolerance. Indeed, we believe both properties are desirable and they strengthen
each other. But we remark that these two properties can be provided separately.
It is relatively straightforward to provide stronger fault tolerance in the a-b-c model in a classic uniform
setting. For example, under partial-synchrony, one can simply use a larger quorum in PBFT (without the
qr/q replica/client quorum separation). But we note that a higher total (a-b-c plus Byzantine) tolerance
comes at the price of a lower Byzantine tolerance. In a uniform setting, this means all clients have to sacrifice
some Byzantine tolerance. In the diverse setting, Flexible BFT gives clients the freedom to choose the fault
assumption they believe in, and a client can choose the classic Byzantine fault model.
On the flip side, if one hopes to support diverse clients in the classic Byzantine fault (no a-b-c faults),
the “dimension of diversity” reduces. One example is the network speed replica protocol in Section 3,
which supports clients that believe in different synchrony bounds. That protocol can be further extended to
support clients with a (uniform) partial-synchrony assumption. Clients with partial-synchrony assumption
are uniform since we have not identified any type of “diversity” outside a-b-c faults for them.
7 Related Work
Most BFT protocols are designed with a uniform assumption about the system. The literature on BFT
consensus is vast and is largely beyond scope for review here; we refer the reader to the standard textbooks
in distributed computing [23, 6].
Resilience. Figure 7 compares resilience in Flexible BFT with some existing consensus protocols. The
x axis represents a Byzantine resilience threshold, the y axis the total resilience against corruption under
the a-b-c fault mode. The three different colors (red, green, blue) represent three possible instantiations of
Flexible BFT at different qr’s.
Each point in the figure represents an abstract “client” belief. For the partial synchrony model, client
beliefs form lines, and for synchronous settings, clients beliefs are individual circles. The locus of points on
a given color represents all client assumptions supported for a corresponding qr, representing the diversity
of clients supported. The figure depicts state-of-art resilience combinations by existing consensus solutions
via uncolored shapes, +,×,M,N,♦,. Partially synchronous protocols [10, 34, 7] that tolerate one-third
Byzantine faults can all be represented by the ‘+’ symbol at (1/3, 1/3). Similarly, synchronous protocols [15,
3, 1] that tolerate one-half Byzantine faults are represented by the ‘×’ symbol at (1/2, 1/2). It is worth noting
that some of these works employ two commit rules that differ in number of votes or synchrony [26, 19, 30, 4].
For instance, Thunderella and Sync HotStuff optimistically commit in an asynchronous fashion based on
quorums of size ≥ 3/4, as represented by a hollow triangle at (1/4, 1/2). Similarly, FaB [26], Zyzzyva [19]
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+ Partially Synchronous protocols [10, 33, 26, 19, 34, 7]
× Synchronous Protocols [30, 15, 4, 1]
N Thunderella, Sync HotStuff (M: optimistic) [30, 4]
 Zyzzyva, SBFT (♦: optimistic) [19]
Figure 7: Comparing Flexible BFT to existing consensus protocols. The legend represent different
qr values.
and SBFT [14] optimistically commit when they receive all votes but wait for two rounds of votes otherwise.
These are represented by two points in the figure. Despite the two commit rules, these protocols do not have
client diversity, all parties involved (replicas and clients) make the same assumptions and reach the same
commit decisions.
Diverse client beliefs. A simple notion of client diversity exists in Bitcoin’s probabilistic commit rule.
One client may consider a transaction committed after six confirmations while another may require only one
confirmation. Generally, the notion of client diversity has been discussed informally at public blockchain
forums.
Another example of diversity is considered in the XFT protocol [22]. The protocol supports two types
of clients: clients that assume crash faults under partial synchrony, or clients that assume Byzantine faults
but believe in synchrony. Yet another notion of diversity is considered by the federated Byzantine consensus
model and the Stellar protocol [27]. The Stellar protocol allows nodes to pick their own quorums. Our
Flexible BFT approach instead considers diverse clients in terms of a-b-c adversaries and synchrony. The
model and techniques in [27] and our paper are largely orthogonal and complementary.
Flexible Paxos. Flexible Paxos by Howard et al. [16] observes that Paxos may use non-intersecting quorums
within a view but an intersection is required across views. Our Flexible Quorum Intersection (b) can be
viewed as its counterpart in the Byzantine and a-b-c setting. In addition, Flexible BFT applies the flexible
quorum idea to support diverse clients with different fault model and timing assumptions.
Mixed fault model. Fault models that mix Byzantine and crash faults have been considered in various
works, e.g., FaB [26] and SBFT [4]. The a-b-c faults are in a sense the opposite of crash faults, mixing
Byzantine with “anti-crashes”. Our a-b-c adversary bears similarity to a rational adversary in the BAR
model [5], with several important differences. BAR assumes no collusion exists among rational replicas
themselves and between rational and Byzantine replicas, whereas a-b-c replicas have no such constraint.
BAR solutions are designed to expose cheating behavior and thus deter rational replicas from cheating. The
Flexible BFT approach does not rely on deterrence for good behavior, and breaks beyond the 1/3 (1/2)
corruption tolerance threshold in asynchronous (synchronous) systems. Last, BAR solutions address only
the partial synchrony settings. At the same time, BAR provides a game theoretic proof of rationality. More
generally, game theoretical modeling and analysis with collusion have been performed to other problems
such as secret sharing and multiparty computation [2, 24, 13, 18]. Analyzing incentives for the a-b-c model
remains an open challenge.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
We present Flexible BFT, a protocol that supports diverse clients with different assumptions to use the
same ledger. Flexible BFT allows the clients to tolerate combined (Byzantine plus alive-but-corrupt) faults
exceeding 1/2 and 1/3 for synchrony and partial synchrony respectively. At a technical level, under synchrony,
we show a synchronous protocol where the replicas execute a network speed protocol and only the commit
rule uses the synchrony assumption. For partial synchrony, we introduce the notion of Flexible Byzantine
Quorums by deconstructing existing BFT protocols to understand the role played by the different quorums.
We combine the two to form Flexible BFT which obtains the best of both worlds.
Our liveness proof in Section 5.4 employs a strong assumption that all clients have correct commit rules.
This is because our alive-but-corrupt fault model did not specify what these replicas would do if they can
violate safety for some clients. In particular, they may stop helping liveness. However, we believe this
will not be a concern once we move to a more realistic rational model. In that case, the best strategy for
alive-but-corrupt replicas is to attack the safety of clients with unsafe commit rules while preserving liveness
for clients with correct commit rules. Such an analysis in the rational fault model remains interesting future
work. Our protocol also assumes that all replicas have clocks that advance at the same rate. It is interesting
to explore whether our protocol can be modified to work with clock drifts.
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